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Abstract— This paper introduces a framework to capture
previously intractable optimization constraints and transform
them to a mixed-integer linear program, through the use of
neural networks. We encode the feasible space of optimiza-
tion problems characterized by both tractable and intractable
constraints, e.g. differential equations, to a neural network.
Leveraging an exact mixed-integer reformulation of neural net-
works, we solve mixed-integer linear programs that accurately
approximate solutions to the originally intractable non-linear
optimization problem. We apply our methods to the AC opti-
mal power flow problem (AC-OPF), where directly including
dynamic security constraints renders the AC-OPF intractable.
Our proposed approach has the potential to be significantly
more scalable than traditional approaches. We demonstrate our
approach for power system operation considering N-1 security
and small-signal stability, showing how it can efficiently obtain
cost-optimal solutions which at the same time satisfy both static
and dynamic security constraints.
Index Terms— Neural networks, mixed-integer linear pro-
gramming, optimal power flow, power system security.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
In a wide range of optimization problems, especially re-
lated to physical systems, the feasible space is characterized
by differential equations and other intractable constraints
[1]. Inspired by power system operation, this paper uses the
AC optimal power flow (AC-OPF) problem with dynamic
security constraints as a guiding example to introduce a
framework that efficiently captures previously intractable
constraints and transforms them to a mixed-integer linear
program, through the use of neural networks. More specif-
ically, we use neural networks to encode the previously in-
tractable feasible space, and through an exact transformation
we convert them to a set of linear constraints with binary
variables that can be integrated to an equivalent mixed-
integer linear problem (MILP).
Power system security assessment is among the most
fundamental functions of power system operators. With
growing uncertainty both in generation and demand, the
complexity of this task further increases, necessitating the
development of new approaches [2]. In power systems, the
AC optimal power flow (AC-OPF) is an essential tool for
cost-optimal and secure power system operation [3]. The
non-convex AC-OPF problem minimizes an objective func-
tion (e.g. generation cost) subject to steady-state operational
constraints (on e.g. voltage magnitudes and transmission line
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flows). While the obtained generation dispatch from the AC-
OPF solution ensures compliance with static security criteria
such as N-1 security, the dispatch additionally needs to
comply with dynamic security criteria such as small-signal
or transient stability. However, directly including dynamic
security constraints renders the AC-OPF problem intractable
[4]. To obtain solutions which satisfy both static and dynamic
security criteria, we propose a novel framework using neural
networks to encode dynamic security constrained AC-OPF
to MILPs.
B. Literature Review
In literature, a range of works [5]–[8] have proposed
iterative approaches and approximations to account for dy-
namic security constraints in AC-OPF problems. For a
comprehensive review please refer to [4]. The work in
[5] considers transient stability by discretizing a simplified
formulation of the power system dynamics and proposes an
iterative solution scheme. Alternatively, to include transient
stability constraints, the work in [6] proposes a hybrid
solution approach using evolutionary algorithms. The work
in [7] addresses voltage stability and proposes a three-
level hierarchical scheme to identify suitable preventive and
corrective control actions. To approximate the small-signal
stability criterion, the work in [8] linearizes the system state
around a given operating point and includes the eigenvalue
sensitivities in the AC-OPF problem. While the majority of
these approaches are tailored to a specific dynamic stability
criterion and require to iteratively solve non-linear programs
(NLPs), in this paper we propose a general framework which
allows us to encode any security criterion.
A range of machine learning approaches have been pro-
posed to learn optimal solutions to the AC-OPF problem
[9], [10] and approximations thereof such as the DC-OPF
problem [11]–[16], without considering dynamic security
constraints. The work in [9] compares different machine
learning approaches and finds that neural networks achieve
the best performance. To predict optimal solutions to AC-
OPF problems, the work in [10] trains deep neural networks
and penalizes constraints violations. For the DC-OPF ap-
proximation, the work in [11] trains deep neural networks
as well, achieving a speed-up of two orders of magnitude
compared to conventional methods. The same authors extend
this work in [12] to account for static security constraints.
Instead of directly learning the optimal solutions, the works
in [13]–[16] predict the set of active constraints for the DC-
OPF approximation. Note that the DC-OPF approximation
neglects reactive power, voltage magnitudes and losses and
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can lead to substantial errors [17]. While these approaches
demonstrate substantial computational speed-up compared to
conventional solvers, they do not account for dynamic secu-
rity criteria, and rely on a large training dataset of computed
optimal solutions to the AC-OPF problem. Obtaining such a
dataset is computationally prohibitive for dynamic security-
constrained AC-OPF.
Using machine learning techniques for static and dynamic
security assessment has been explored in literature (e.g.
[18]–[20]), for a comprehensive survey please refer to [21].
The main area of application has been the screening of a
large number of operating points with respect to different
security criteria. Several works have shown that the proposed
machine learning methods including neural networks require
only a fraction of the computational time for conventional
methods. Fewer works [22]–[24] explored using machine
learning techniques to directly include dynamic security
constraints in AC-OPF problems. The work in [22] proposed
ensemble decision trees to identify corrective actions to
satisfy security criteria. Embedding the decision trees in an
AC-OPF framework requires to solve computationally highly
expensive mixed-integer non-linear problems (MINLPs). To
address computational tractability, the work in [23] proposed
a second-order cone relaxation of the AC-OPF to relax
the MINLP to a mixed-integer second-order cone program
(MISOCP). This, however, does not guarantee feasibility
of the obtained solution in case the relaxation is inexact.
The work in [24] uses a non-linear representation of neural
networks with one single hidden layer to represent the sta-
bility boundary in the AC-OPF problem. Instead of solving
computationally expensive NLPs or MINLPs, we propose
a novel framework using neural networks to encode the
dynamic security constrained AC-OPF to MILPs.
C. Main Contributions
The main contributions of our work are:
1) Using classification neural networks we encode the
feasible space of AC-OPF problems including any type
of static and dynamic security criteria.
2) Leveraging a mixed-integer linear reformulation of
the trained neural network and a systematic iterative
procedure to include non-linear equality constraints,
we accurately approximate cost-optimal solutions to
the original intractable AC-OPF problems.
3) We introduce a method to trade-off conservativeness
of the neural network prediction with cost-optimality,
ensuring feasibility of the obtained solutions.
4) Considering both N-1 security and small-signal stabil-
ity, and using an IEEE 14 bus system, we demonstrate
how the proposed approach allows to obtain cost-
optimal solutions which at the same time satisfy both
static and dynamic security constraints.
D. Outline
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section II,
we formulate optimization problems with intractable dy-
namic security constraints including the dynamic security-
constrained AC optimal power flow. In Section III, we
encode the feasible space using neural networks, state the
mixed-integer linear reformulation of the trained neural net-
work, and introduce efficient methods to include equality
constraints and to ensure feasibility. In Section IV, we
demonstrate our methods using an IEEE 14 bus system
and considering both N-1 security and small-signal stability.
Section V concludes. The code to reproduce all reported
results is available online [25].
II. NON-LINEAR OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS WITH
DYNAMIC SECURITY CONSTRAINTS
A. General Formulation
We consider the following class of non-linear optimization
problems with intractable dynamic constraints:
min
x∈X ,u∈U
f(u) (1)
s.t. gi(x,u) ≤ 0 ∀ i = 1, ...,m (2)
hi(x,u) = 0 ∀ i = 1, ..., n (3)
φi(x,u) ∈ Si ∀ i = 1, ..., l (4)
The variables are split into state variables x and control
variables u which are constrained to the sets X and U ,
respectively. The objective function is denoted with f in (1).
There is a number of m and n non-linear inequality and
equality constraints g and h, respectively. The l number of
constraints φ in (4) encode dynamic security constraints (e.g.
based on differential equations) and are intractable. While
the non-linear optimization problem (1)–(3) can be solved
using a non-linear solver, the addition of the constraints
in (4) renders the optimization problem intractable. Note
that for given fixed system state (x,u) we can determine
computationally efficiently whether it belongs to set S satis-
fying dynamic constraints, i.e. is feasible or infeasible. One
possible solution strategy is to follow an iterative approach
where the optimization problem (1)–(3) is solved first, and
then if constraint (4) is violated a nearby solution is identified
which satisfies (4). This has several drawbacks including
that this procedure does not guarantee the recovery of a
solution that is feasible to the original problem, and the
feasibility recovery procedure does not consider optimality of
the solution. In the following, using power system operation
as a guiding example, we will present an approach that allows
to directly approximate a high-quality solution to (1)–(4) by
solving mixed-integer linear programs instead.
B. Application to AC Optimal Power Flow (AC-OPF)
In the following, we consider the AC-OPF problem with
combined N-1 security and small-signal stability criteria
as guiding example. Note that our proposed methodology
is general and can include any static or dynamic security
criteria. The AC-OPF problem optimizes the operation of a
power grid consisting of a set of N buses connected by
a set of L lines. A subset of the set of N buses has a
generator connected and is denoted with G. The variables
are the vectors of active and reactive power injections p and
q, the voltage magnitudes v and voltage angles θ. Each of
these vectors have the size n× 1, where n is the number of
buses in the set N . The control variables u are the active
power injections and voltage set-points of generators pg and
vg, i.e. the entries in p and q that correspond to the buses
in the set G. If the control variables are fixed, the remaining
state variables can be identified by solving an AC power flow,
i.e. solving a system of non-linear equations [26]. To satisfy
the N-1 security criterion, the identified control variables u
must lead to a power system state which complies with the
operational constraints for a set of line outages. We denote
this set with C, with the first element C1 = {0} corresponding
to the intact system state. The superscript ’c’ in (6)–(13)
denotes the corresponding outaged system state and the
superscript ’0’ the intact system state. To ensure small-
signal stability, we analyze the stability of the linearization
of the power system dynamics around the current operating
point [27]. The system matrix A describes the linearized
system dynamics as function of the current operating point
defined by (p,q,v,θ). To satisfy the small-signal stability
criterion, the minimum damping ratio associated with the
eigenvalues λ of A has to be larger than γmin; where γmin ≤
minλ
−<{λ}√
={λ}2+<{λ}2 . Finally, we formulate the N-1 security
and small-signal stability constrained AC-OPF:
min
pc,qc,vc,θc,λc,νc
f(p0g) (5)
s.t. pmin ≤ pc ≤ pmax ∀c ∈ C (6)
qmin ≤ qc ≤ qmax ∀c ∈ C (7)
vmin ≤ vc ≤ vmax ∀c ∈ C (8)
|sline(pc,qc,vc,θc)| ≤ smaxline ∀c ∈ C (9)
sbalance(p
c,qc,vc,θc) = 0 ∀c ∈ C (10)
p0g = p
c
g, v
0
g = v
c
g ∀c ∈ C (11)
A(pc,qc,vc,θc)νc = λcνc ∀c ∈ C (12)
γmin ≤ min
λc
−<{λc}√
={λc}2+<{λc}2 ∀c ∈ C (13)
The objective function in (5) minimizes the cost of the
system generation for the intact system state. All inequality
and equality constraints (6)–(13) have to hold for the intact
system state and each contingency in C. The inequality con-
straints in (6)–(8) define minimum and maximum limits on
active and reactive power injections and voltage magnitudes.
The inequality constraint in (9) bounds the absolute apparent
branch flow sline for each line in L. The equality constraint in
(10) enforces the AC power flow balance sbalance at each bus
N in the system. For a detailed mathematical description of
the apparent branch flow and the AC power flow balance, for
brevity, please refer to [3]. We consider preventive control
for N-1 security defined in (11), i.e. the generator active
power set-points and voltage set-points remain fixed if a
line outage occurs. In (12) the term ν denotes the right
hand eigenvectors of the system matrix A. Note that the
small-signal stability constraints (12)–(13) have to hold for
each considered line outage in set C. Adding the small-signal
stability constraints in (12)–(13) increases the non-linearity
and computational complexity of the optimization problem
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Fig. 1. Classification neural network with input, hidden and output layers.
The input layer takes the vector u as input. A weight matrix W and bias
b is applied between each layer. At the neurons of each hidden layer the
non-linear ReLU activation function is applied. For the binary classification
the magnitude of the two outputs are compared, i.e. z1 ≥ z2 or z1 < z2.
substantially, rendering it intractable and requiring iterative
solution approaches [8]. In the following, we introduce
a framework which allows to directly approximate cost-
optimal solutions to (5)–(13).
III. METHODOLOGY TO ACCURATELY APPROXIMATE
COST-OPTIMAL AND FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Encoding Feasible Space using Neural Networks
We denote the feasible space F of the optimization prob-
lem (1)–(4) as: F := {x ∈ X and u ∈ U satisfy (2)–(4)}.
As first step, we train a classification neural network which
takes the control variables u ∈ U as input and predicts
whether there exists state variables x ∈ X such that the
resulting operating point is in the feasible space (x,u) ∈ F
or is infeasible (x,u) /∈ F . The general architecture of
the classification neural network is illustrated in Fig. 1. The
neural network is defined by a number K of fully-connected
hidden layers, that each consist of Nk number of neurons
with k = 1, ...,K. The neural network input vector u has
dimension N0 × 1 and the output vector z has dimension
NK+1×1. Here, the dimension of z is 2×1, as we consider
binary classification. The input to each layer yˆk is defined
as:
yˆk+1 =Wk+1yk + bk+1 ∀k = 0, 1, ...,K − 1 (14)
where y0 = u is the input to the neural network. The weight
matrices Wk have dimensions Nk+1×Nk and the bias vector
b has dimension Nk+1× 1. Each neuron in the hidden layer
applies a non-linear activation function to the input. Here,
we assume the ReLU activation function:
yk = max(yˆk, 0) ∀k = 1, ...,K (15)
The ReLU activation function in (15) outputs 0 if the input
yˆ is negative, otherwise it propagates the input yˆ. Note that
the max operator is applied element-wise to the vector yˆk.
The majority of recent neural network applications uses the
ReLU function as activation function as it has been found
to accelerate neural network training [28]. The output of the
neural network is:
z =WK+1yK + bK+1 (16)
For binary classification, based on a comparison of the
magnitude of the neural network output, we can either
classify the input as belonging to the first class z1 ≥ z2
or the second class z2 > z1. Here, the first class z1 ≥ z2
corresponds to the prediction that the input is in the feasible
space u ∈ F , and the second class z2 > z1 to the prediction
that the input is not in the feasible space u /∈ F .
To train the neural network a dataset of labeled samples
is required. The performance of the neural network highly
depends on the quality of the dataset used.To encode the
feasible space F of a general optimization problem (1)–
(4), we sample u from the set U and determine whether
the sample is feasible or not. For the application to the N-1
security and small-signal stability constrained AC-OPF in
(5)–(13) this requires to sample u = [p0g v
0
g]
T from within
the limits defined in (6)–(8), and then test feasibility with
respect to all constraints (6)–(13). If available, historical data
of secure operating points can be used by the transmission
system operator in conjunction with dataset creation meth-
ods. To achieve satisfactory neural network performance, the
goal of the dataset creation is to create a balanced dataset
of feasible and infeasible operating points which at the
same time describe the feasibility boundary in detail. This is
particularly important in AC-OPF applications as large parts
of the possible sampling space lead to infeasible operating
points [29]. While the dataset creation is not the scope of
this work, several approaches [29]–[31] focus on efficient
methods to create datasets.
Before training of the neural network, the dataset is split
into a training and test data set. During training of classifica-
tion networks, the cross-entropy loss function is minimized
using stochastic gradient descent [32]. This penalizes the
deviation between the predicted and true label of the training
dataset. The weight matrices W and biases b are updated at
each iteration of the training to minimize the loss function.
After training, the generalization capability of the neural
network is evaluated by calculating the accuracy and other
relevant metrics on the unseen test data set.
B. Exact Mixed-Integer Reformulation of Trained Neural
Network
With the goal of using the trained neural network in an
optimization framework, following the work in [33], we first
need to reformulate the maximum operator in (15) using
binary variables bk ∈ 0, 1Nk for all k = 1, ...,K:
yk = max(yˆk, 0)⇒

yk ≤ yˆk − yˆmink (1− bk)(17a)
yk ≥ yˆk (17b)
yk ≤ yˆmaxk bk (17c)
yk ≥ 0 (17d)
bk ∈ {0, 1}Nk (17e)
We introduce one binary variable for each neuron in the
hidden layers of the neural network. In case the input to
the neuron is yˆ ≤ 0 then the corresponding binary variable
is 0 and (17c) and (17d) constrain the neuron output yk to
0. Conversely, if the input to the neuron is yˆ ≥ 0, then
the binary variable is 1 and (17a) and (17b) constrain the
neuron output yk to the input yˆk. Note that the minimum
and maximum bounds on the neuron output yˆmin and yˆmax
have to be chosen large enough to not be binding and as
small as possible to facilitate tight bounds for the mixed-
integer solver. We compute suitable bounds using interval
arithmetic [33]. To maintain scalability of the resulting MILP,
several approaches have been proposed in literature including
weight and ReLU pruning [34]. Here, we follow [34] and
prune weight matrices W during training, i.e. we gradually
enforce a defined share of entries to be zero.
C. Mixed-Integer Non-Linear Approximation
Based on the exact mixed-integer reformulation of the
trained neural network with (14), (16) and (17a)–(17e), we
can approximate solutions to the intractable problem (5)–(13)
by solving the following tractable mixed-integer non-linear
optimization problem instead:
min
p0,q0,v0,θ0
yˆ,y,z
f(p0g) (18)
s.t. pming ≤ p0g ≤ pmaxg (19)
vming ≤ v0g ≤ vmaxg (20)
sbalance(p
0,q0,v0,θ0) = 0 (21)
yˆ1 =W1[p
0
g v
0
g]
T + b1 (22)
yˆk =Wkyk−1 + bk ∀k = 2, ...,K (23)
(17a)− (17e) ∀k = 1, ...,K (24)
z =WK+1yK + bK+1 (25)
z1 ≥ z2 (26)
The inequality constraints (19)–(20) provide upper and lower
bounds on the control variables u = [p0g v
0
g]
T . For the
intact system state, (21) ensures the non-linear AC power
balance for each bus. The exact mixed-integer reformulation
of the neural network is given in (22)–(25). The constraint
on the neural network output z in (26) ensures that the neural
network predicts that the input [p0g v
0
g] belongs to the feasible
space F of the original problem in (5)–(13). Note that
the neural network (22)–(26) encodes all constraints related
to N-1 security and small-signal stability, and eliminates
all related optimization variables. The remaining non-linear
constraint in (21) enforces the non-linear AC power flow
balance for the intact system state and requires to maintain
the state variables for the intact system state only. While
the number of optimization variables in (18)–(26) has been
substantially reduced compared to (5)–(13), the resulting
optimization problem is a mixed-integer non-linear problem,
which are in general hard to solve. In the following, we
will propose a systematic procedure to handle the non-linear
equality constraint in (21).
D. Mixed-Integer Linear Approximation
The non-linear AC power flow equations described by the
nodal power balance in (21) can be summed over all buses.
Then, we take the real part and write the summed active
power balance as:∑
G
p0g +
∑
N
p0d + plosses(p
0,q0,v0,θ0) = 0 (27)
The first term
∑
G p
0
g is the sum of active power generation
and the second term
∑
N p
0
d the sum of the active power
loading of the system where the parameter p0d represent the
active power load at each bus in N . The third term plosses en-
capsulates the non-linearity and represents the active power
losses. We propose to use an iterative linear approximation of
the third non-linear term with a first-order Taylor expansion.
At iteration i+ 1, we approximate (27) as:∑
G
p0g +
∑
N
p0d + plosses|i+
δplosses
δp0g
|i(p0g − p0g|i) + δplossesδv0g |i(v
0
g − v0g|i) = 0 (28)
The notation |i is shorthand for evaluated at the operating
point of the i-th iteration, i.e. at (p0,q0,v0,θ0)|i. At the
current operating point, we evaluate the value of the losses
plosses|i and the gradients with respect to the active gen-
erator dispatch δplossesδp0g |i and the generator voltages
δplosses
δv0g
|i,
respectively. Then, we approximate the value of the losses
as a function of both the active generator dispatch and the
generator voltages using the first-order Taylor expansion.
The iterative scheme has the following steps. To initialize
for iteration i = 0, we linearize around a known operating
point (p0,q0,v0,θ0)|i=0, e.g. the solution to the AC-OPF or
N-1 security-constrained AC-OPF problem. Then, we solve
the following mixed-integer linear program for iteration i:
min
p0g,v
0
g,yˆ,y,z
f(p0g) (29)
s.t. (19), (20), (22)− (26), (28) (30)
By iteratively linearizing the non-linear equation in (21), we
solve MILPs instead of MINLPs. MILPs can be solved at
a fraction of the time required for MINLPs as the con-
vexity of the problem without integer variables allows for
a significantly improved pruning of the branch-and-bound
procedure. Based on the result of this optimization problem,
we subsequently run an AC power flow for the intact system
state to recover the full power system state and the losses.
The iterative scheme converges if the change between the
active power losses between iteration i and i − 1 is below
a defined threshold ρ: plosses|i−plosses|i−1plosses|i ≤ ρ. Otherwise, we
resolve (29)–(30) with the loss parameters in (28) updated.
In Section IV-B, we demonstrate fast convergence of this
method.
E. Ensuring Feasibility of Solutions
The classification neural network is trained on a finite
number of data samples and with a finite number of neurons.
As a result, there might be a mismatch between the prediction
of the feasibility boundary and the actual true feasibility
boundary. This could lead to falsely identifying an operating
point as feasible while it is in fact not feasible. Note that
feasibility refers to satisfication of both static and dynamic
security criteria. To control the conservativeness of the neural
network prediction we introduce an additional constant factor
in the classification and replace (26) in the MILP formulation
Fig. 2. Illustrative reduction of predicted feasible space: Red dots
are predicted infeasible, blue dots are predicted feasible. The grey area
represents the true feasible space. The black dotted line represents the
predicted feasibility boundary. The green dotted line is the predicted feasi-
bility boundary after introducing a suitable  in the classification decision
z1 ≥ z2 + .
(29)–(29) with:
z1 ≥ z2 +  (31)
Adding the term  to the right hand side in (31) effectively
shrinks the size of the predicted feasible space. This reduces
the risk that operating points close to the feasibility boundary
are falsely classified as feasible. At the same time, this can
lead to an increase of the cost of operation, i.e. there is
a trade-off between ensuring feasibility and optimality. In
Fig. 2 we illustrate the reduction of the predicted feasible
space by introducing . In Section IV-B, we quantify in detail
the trade-off between ensuring feasibility and obtaining a
cost-optimal solution.
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
In the following, we demonstrate our proposed methodol-
ogy using an IEEE 14-bus system and considering combined
N-1 security and small-signal stability as security criteria.
The code to reproduce all reported results is available online
[25].
A. Simulation Setup
As test case, we use the IEEE 14-bus system from [35]
consisting of 5 generators, 11 loads and 20 lines with
the following modifications: For the N-1 security criterion,
we consider all possible line outages except of the lines
connecting buses 7 to 8 and 6 to 13, similar to previous works
[29]. Including these outages would render the problem
infeasible. Furthermore, we enlarge the apparent branch flow
limits in (9) by 30% and the reactive power generator limits
in (7) by 25% to be able to obtain feasible solutions. To
build the system matrix A of the small signal stability model
in (12), we use a tenth-order synchronous machine model
and follow standard modeling procedures outlined in [27].
We use Mathematica [36] to derive the small signal model
symbolically, MATPOWER AC power flows to initialize
the system matrix [35], and Matlab [37] to compute its
eigenvalues and damping ratio, and assess the small-signal
stability for each operating point and contingency. Note
that we require a minimum damping ratio γmin of 3%.
The control variables are generator active power set-points
u = p0g and the voltage set-points are assumed to be fixed
v0g = [1.06, 1.045, 1.01, 1.02, 1.01].
To create the dataset of labeled operating points, we
discretize the set U within the minimum and maximum
generator limits in (19). For each sample, we compute the
feasibility w.r.t. combined N-1 security and small-signal
stability. As large parts of this set lead to infeasible solutions,
we resample around identified feasible solutions. As a result,
we obtain a dataset of 36’144 datapoints with 50.0% feasible
and 50.0% infeasible samples. We split the dataset into 80%
training and 20% test set and train a neural network with
3 hidden layers and 50 neurons in each hidden layer using
TensorFlow [32]. During training, we gradually increase the
enforced sparsity of the weight matrices to 70%, i.e. 70%
of the entries of W have to be zero. This increases the
tractability of the resulting MILPs significantly [34]. Finally,
we obtain a trained neural network with a predictive accuracy
of 99.3% on the test dataset, showing good generalization
capability of the neural network.
We formulate the mixed-integer linear programs (29)–
(30) in YALMIP [38] and solve it using Gurobi [39]. We
evaluate the performance of our methodology for 125 random
objective functions. For these we draw random linear cost
coefficients for each of the five generators between 5 $MW and
20 $MW using Latin hypercube sampling. We initialize the loss
approximation in (28) with the solution to the AC-OPF for
each random cost function. The computational experiments
are run on a standard laptop.
B. Simulation Results
In Table I, we compare the solutions to AC-OPF and
N-1 security constrained AC-OPF (both solved using MAT-
POWER and IPOPT [40]) with our proposed approach
encoding the feasible space to MILPs in terms of problem
formulation and type, generation cost, solver time and share
of feasible instances for 125 instances with random cost
functions. Both the AC-OPF and N-1 security constrained
AC-OPF do not return a feasible solution for 64.8% of the
125 random test instances, requiring computationally expen-
sive post-processing. Following our proposed approach, for a
value of  = 0, we decrease this share to 44.0%. Introducing
a value of  = 8 in the classification decision of the neural
network in (31) allows us to obtain feasible solutions for all
test instances, i.e. all obtained solutions satisfy N-1 security
and small-signal stability criteria. Note that we select the
value of  = 8 based on a sensitivity analysis that we
explain in detail in the following paragraphs. The iterative
loss approximation in (28) with ρ = 1% converges rapidly
within 1.04 iterations on average and at most 2. This shows
good performance of the proposed approach to handle the
equality constraint.
In Table I, the average cost increase of including N-1 se-
curity evaluates to 5.7%, and including small-signal stability
leads to an additional increase of 2.1% which is expected.
Notably, the additional cost increase by introducing a value
of  = 8, i.e. increasing the conservativeness of the neural
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Fig. 3. The resulting generator dispatch for 125 random cost functions.
Note that the dispatch of generators 1–3 varies with changing cost functions,
while the dispatch of generators 4 and 5 remains constant.
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Fig. 4. For 125 random cost functions, we show the share of feasible
instances and average cost function as function of parameter . The average
cost increase with increasing value of  is low (for  = 10 at most 0.7%)
while the share of feasible instances increases from 56% to 100%.
network prediction, evaluates only to 0.5%, while it increases
the share of feasible instances from 56.0% to 100%. On
average, each MILP instance solves in 0.22 s and 0.12 s for
 = 0 and  = 10, respectively, and is comparable to the com-
putational time of 0.15 s of solving N-1 security constrained
AC-OPF which cannot, however, handle the small-signal sta-
bility constraints, or any other dynamic security constraints.
Note that in terms of scalability, our proposed approach
requires only to include the control variables of the intact
system state, and depends mainly on the tractability of the
MILP reformulation of the neural network. The complexity
of N-1 security constrained AC-OPF increases exponentially
for large scale instances requiring iterative solution schemes
[4]. In Fig. 3 we show the resulting generator dispatch for
125 random cost functions obtained by solving the MILPs. It
can be noted that the dispatch of generators 1–3 varies with
changing cost functions, while the dispatch of generators 4
and 5 remains constant.
To explore the trade-off between conservativeness of the
neural network boundary prediction (through increasing )
and the resulting generation cost increase, Fig. 4 shows the
share of feasible instances and the average objective value
for  ranging from 0 to 10. It can be noted that the average
cost has a small linear increase with , reaching at most 0.7%
increase for  = 10. The share of feasible instances increases
in two jumps from  = 2 to 3 (from 56.0 % to 80.8%) and
from  = 7 to 8, from 82.4% to 100%. In addition, for the
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF PROBLEM FORMULATION AND TYPE, GENERATION COST, SOLVER TIME AND SHARE OF FEASIBLE INSTANCES FOR 125 INSTANCES
WITH RANDOM COST FUNCTIONS
Problem Problem Generation Solver Share of feasible
formulation type cost ($) time (s) instances (%)
AC-OPF NLP 2425.94 (0.0%) 0.04 35.2
+ N-1 security NLP 2565.13 (5.7%) 0.15 35.2
+ small-signal stability ( = 0) MILP 2615.43 (7.8%) 0.22 56.0
+ small-signal stability ( = 8) MILP 2628.37 (8.3%) 0.12 100.0
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Fig. 5. For the dataset of 36’144 samples, accuracy, true positive rate
(TPR) and true negative rate (TNR) of the neural network are shown for
different values of . TPR and TNR denote the share of feasible and not
feasible samples that are correctly predicted as feasible and not feasible,
respectively. Note that these are independent of the random cost function.
full dataset of 36’144 samples, Fig. 5 shows the accuracy,
the true positive rate (TPR) and the true negative rate (TNR)
for different values of . TPR and TNR denote the share of
feasible and not feasible samples that are correctly predicted
as feasible and not feasible, respectively. It can be observed
that for  = 3 the TNR increases to 100%, i.e. no infeasible
sample in the full training and test dataset is classified falsely
as feasible. To obtain a share of 100% feasible solutions to
the 125 random objective functions, the value of  needs to
be increased further to 8 (as shown in Fig. 4), resulting to
a neural network accuracy of 93.3%. As an alternative to
the proposed heuristic of identifying , our future work is
directed towards robust retraining of neural networks [41].
V. CONCLUSION
We introduce a framework that can efficiently capture
previously intractable optimization constraints and transform
them to a mixed-integer linear program, through the use of
neural networks. First, we encode the feasible space which
is characterized by both tractable and intractable constraints,
e.g. constraints based on differential equations, to a neural
network. Leveraging an exact mixed-integer reformulation
of the trained neural network, and an efficient method to
include non-linear equality constraints, we solve mixed-
integer linear programs that can efficiently approximate
non-linear optimization programs with previously intractable
constraints. We apply our methods to the AC optimal power
flow problem with dynamic security constraints. For an
IEEE 14-bus system, and considering a combination of N-1
security and small-signal stability, we demonstrate how the
proposed approach allows to obtain cost-optimal solutions
which at the same time satisfy both static and dynamic
security constraints. Future work is directed towards utilizing
efficient dataset creation methods [29]–[31] and increasing
robustness of classification neural networks [41] to boost the
applicability of this approach.
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